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THE APPROACH TO FRENCH LAW
FREDERICK H. LAWSONt
French law is one of the most important that the world has known.
With more or less change it has spread, over half of the western part of
continental Europe and the parts of other continents which are or were
subject to its administration as colonies, over the greater part of Latin
America and over much of the Middle East. It has a magnificent litera-
ture, and although it has a long history, it seems to possess the secret
of unlimited but gradual growth. But it is also a member of a large
family of laws which is known to common lawyers as the Civil Law. It
is on the whole the most accessible member of that family to English
speaking lawyers, and therefore forms a most appropriate subject for
the first lecture in this series. Much that must be said about it is also
true of other civil law systems and need not be repeated later.
The term "Civil Law" is a misleading though not entirely untrue
description. It applies in only a slight degree to public law or criminal
law. But it does help to emphasize the fact that French law and the
other civil law systems make a much clearer distinction than common
law systems between public and private law. For common lawyers the
distinction is mainly literary. The subject matter of the two types of
law is sufficiently different to justify dealing with them in different
chapters or different books, but there is no sense of entering a different
world when passing from one to the other. In French law, on the other
hand, that sense is very marked, because cases concerning public admin-
istration fall within the jurisdiction of a special hierarchy of administra-
tive courts which do not deal with cases between one private person or
corporation and another, and the whole atmosphere of the law which
they apply is very different from that of the law applied in the ordinary
civil courts. Hence the distinction between public and private law is
one of kind and not a matter of mere classification.
PUBLIC LAW
French public law is of absorbing interest. Many persons who
would not think of themselves as comparative lawyers know a good deal
about the Conseil d'Rtat, the supreme administrative court, and hold it
up as a model to common lawyers. It is very French, though the general
t Barrister (Gray's Inn); Professor of Comparative Law, Oxford University,
England.
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part of the administrative law it applies is in some respects like the Com-
mon Law, being uncodified judge-made law. I shall say very little about
it. American lawyers are unlikely to come into contact with it in the
course of their practice except in relation to tax problems and there the
expert advice they will need is that of a very specialized type of lawyer.
But it is worthy of mention that although French administrative law is
not Civil Law, its separate existence is characteristic of a civil law sys-
tem. Since Civil Law had hardly anything to say about the solution of
administrative problems, administration was at first the field of arbi-
trary action. The development of administrative law by the Conseil
d'P-tat represents the conquest of a new field of activity for the rule of
law, though a law which is different from the Civil Law. Some would
say, perhaps with some exaggeration, that administrative action is now
more effectively controlled by law in France than in Common Law coun-
tries. On the other hand, constitutional law is hardly law in the full
sense that it has acquired in America, but is more akin to political science.
Nor shall I say more about criminal law than that it is completely
codified and that its general part is more specifically worked out and
studied than the part devoted to the definition of specific offences. Here
is a marked contrast to the criminal law of common law countries.
CIVIL LAW
We come then to French private law. Here I shall leave on one side
commercial law, partly because I do not know it at all well and partly
because, however great has been the part it played in the past in develop-
ing the semi-international law merchant, it is not a world leader today.
French civil law in the narrow sense of the term is, on the other hand,
very much alive and very progressive. It is constantly being studied by
lawyers outside the countries where it is in force.
This is Civil Law in two senses. First, there is the usual meaning
of "civil" which marks it off from public, criminal and commercial law.
Secondly, it is this part of French law that is pre-eminently Civil Law
in contrast to what we call Common Law. If French law is a civil law
system and not a common law system, it is because this civil law in the
narrower sense of the term has features which distinguish it very clearly
from common law systems. Moreover it is not unfair to give peculiar
prominence to the civil law portion of French law because, like common
law in the narrower sense, to the exclusion of enactments but with the
inclusion of equity, it forms a sort of general legal grammar which is
used to supplement other parts of French law where they are deficient in
general principle. The Civil Code, which contains the fundamental rules
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and principles of civil law, is the most central and essential part of French
law. Hence, if a foreign student wishes to acquire a grasp of French
law and can devote very little time to the task, he must at all costs study
civil law if he neglects all else, just as a foreign student who studies only
common law and equity has the makings in him of a good American or
English lawyer, whereas if he studies only the enacted parts of the law
he remains wholly uneducated.
THE INFLUENCE OF ROMAN LAW
We must now ask what it is that makes French Civil Law a member
of the large family of civil law systems. The main bond of union be-
tween those systems is the possession of a legal grammar derived from
Roman Law. Common lawyers, when they pay any attention to the Civil
Law ordinarily fall into the trap of regarding it as no more than modern-
ized Roman Law. From a scholarly point of view and particularly
from that of the comparative lawyer, the error is unfortunate, for it over-
emphasizes the resemblance between the various civil law systems and
leaves out of account many elements which have little or nothing to do
with Roman Law. Thus, most of family law and much of the law of
succession are derived from old customs which varied greatly in different
countries, regions, towns and even villages, though some of the technical
apparatus of those parts of the law, in contradistinction to its policy, is
of Roman origin. And although the law of property and the law of ob-
ligations, which includes the law of contracts, torts and unjust enrich-
ment, are derived ultimately from Roman Law, anyone brought up on
the pure Roman Law of the ancient world must accustom himself to
many un-Roman generalizations and to new ideas that have come from
outside.
These factors have led many good comparative lawyers to hold that
the study of French law should not be through Roman Law. I am stub-
born in my conviction that they are wrong for two main reasons, one of
them general, and the other especially appropriate to the practical needs
of foreign lawyers who may have to deal with French law. Let me
take the latter first.
A distinction is often drawn between lawyers' law and laymen's
law. The former has been made or developed by lawyers in the courts or
in the universities. It is their special province, they claim an almost
exclusive knowledge of it and they take a certain responsibility for its
form and content. The heart of it is the law of property in its broadest
sense and the law of obligations. Here the policy of the law has usually
been overlaid in course of time by a mass of technical rules and principles,
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which demand the constant attention of the lawyer. Neither the lawyer
nor the layman is now greatly concerned with the underlying policy. On
the other hand, in family law and the law of succession, although the
lawyer is needed to deal with technique, questions of policy are now very
much to the fore and they are not so much the lawyer's business as the
layman's. When lawyers practice these branches of law they doubtless
get an excellent livelihood, but as servants, not as masters. Law teachers
can do little to mold them; they can only expound them.
Now the parts of French Civil Law which are lawyers' law most
deserve the attention of foreign lawyers, not only because they are likely
to present to him the most practical problems but also because they are
likely to be the most difficult to understand. In course of time, lawyers'
law tends to take on more and more the character of a stubborn, artificial
and coherent philosophy. Since it is stubborn, lawyers adhere to it even
when they cannot understand it; since it is artificial, it cannot always be
understood by the light of natural reason; since it is coherent, no one part
of it can be properly grasped without a comprehension of the whole.
Legal systems have often been likened to languages. At all these several
points, the comparison is surely just.
Now as I have already said, this lawyers' law part of the Civil Law
is for the most part of Roman origin. The main inhibitions which are
everywhere necessary to prevent a lawyer "going off the rails," are in
the Civil Law of Roman origin. Since it is Roman Law which binds all
the civil law systems together, and since the elementary study of Roman
Law is much easier than that of any modern system, it is wise for a stu-
dent of French law to start with a brief study of Roman Law.
But there is, as I said, a more general argument in favor of teaching
French law through Roman Law. The parts of French law which were
until recently most systematically taught were the most Roman, and the
hard core of French legal doctrine is to be found in the very Roman Law
of property and obligations, which plays the same role in French law as
the specifically common law portions of the common law systems. Now,
in Maitland's phrase, "Taught law makes tough law." A body of law
taught for many generations creates inhibitions in lawyers who have
passed through a traditional education in it. It forms a conceptual struc-
ture of legal thought from which lawyers escape only with difficulty.
All civil lawyers think on Roman lines even when their law is not Roman.
Common lawyers do not.
I cannot describe these inhibitions in detail. I shall select for brief
mention only two, an almost instinctive insistence on the distinction be-
tween real and personal rights and a constant hankering after absolute and
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undivided ownership. Thus the trust, which to us seems an almost in-
dispensable institution, is very hard for civil lawyers to understand,
much harder to accept.
It was the difficulty that Hohfeld encountered of placing the right
of the beneficiary of a trust into either the class of real rights or that of
personal rights that led him to investigate the nature of a real right and
then of rights in general. He concluded that the distinction between real
and personal rights was not one of kind but of degree, the persons of in-
cidence being in the one case many and in the other few. But in Roman
Law, the line between the two is sharp, and although it became vague in
the Middle Ages, all aberrations were abolished in modern times and the
line became sharp again. A right is either real, as we say with some in-
accuracy operative against all the world, or personal, operative only
against some determinate person or persons.
Thus, whereas for Hohfeld the right of a beneficiary, a cestui que
trust, is real, since it can be cut off only by a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice, actual or constructive, of the trust, a civil lawyer
would have to call it personal and so exclude it from the law of property
and relegate it to that of obligations-which would deprive it of what for
us is its most important characteristic.
Or look at it in another way. Property and obligation are kept
clearly apart; and the primary questions in property law have to do with
ownership. Now the trust is essentially a personal relation between
trustee and beneficiary. We think of the beneficiary's personal right
against the trustee as also constituting a species of property which can
be owned, a chose in action. This conception is not easily accepted by a
French lawyer, who most naturally thinks of ownership as attaching to
physical objects; some civilians indeed find it difficult to speak of owning
a patent or copyright.
The hankering after absolute and undivided ownership, though it must
give way on occasion to urgent needs, cannot tolerate anything compar-
able to the common law doctrine of estates or the distinction between
legal and equitable ownership. Although French lawyers, under the title
of patrimoine, know the revolving fund, they have difficulty in conceiv-
ing of it as being owned. Here again there is a barrier which those who
urge a frank acceptance of the trust find it difficult to surmount, for the
trust in its most useful modern forms creates interests in such funds
rather than in the physical objects of which they are from time to time
composed.
Of course, most of what we do by means of the trust is done in
French law also, but by different means, viz., by the technique of
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guardianship, by the recognition of foundations as institutions regulated
by public law and by very complicated arrangements in the law regulat-
ing the property relations of husband and wife-all of them fascinating
topics demanding careful study by comparative lawyers. But French
law cannot apply to the solution of problems any such general purpose
instrument as the trust.
Finally, the distinction between property and obligation combined
with the hankering after undivided ownership to delay for many cen-
turies the full protection of a lessee's right to land. Since a lease is a
contract, it should bind only the lessor to the lessee, and although the
lessee is now fully protected against anyone who has purchased the land
from his lessor, the sacrifice of logic has not been carried far enough to
allow him to mortgage his lease.
STUDY OF THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE
I have said that no part of a tight conceptual structure can be fully
understood without an understanding of the whole. This is not so dif-
ficult as it might seem. A grasp of the main elements of Roman Law
can be acquired quite easily and quickly, and without any knowledge of
the Latin language. When one passes beyond that stage and approaches
French law, the language question becomes important. Fortunately,
there is a good book on French law in English, an Introduction to French
Law, by the late Sir Maurice Amos and the late Dr. F. P. Walton. Un-
fortunately, it is out of print and hard to get, but a new edition will, it
is hoped, appear in the course of the next year or two. Both authors had
long experience of the practice as well as the theory of French law. Be-
yond that, the student of French law must have a working knowledge of
French. He need not speak it or even be able to understand it when
spoken. Still less need he write it. But he must be able to read it.
French is not so remote from English as to make that a difficult task.
Most of the abstract terms, which are always occurring in law books, are
the same.
Dictionaries, even those called legal dictionaries, afford little help.
They provide indeed a starting point but no more, for commonly enough
exact equivalents cannot be found. Indeed one ought not to search for
such equivalents. The only way to get a firm grasp of the meaning of
a word-more especially if it is technical-is to see how it is used. For
this purpose the best dictionary is one of the standard textbooks such as
Colin, Capitant et Julliot de la Morandi~re, Traits de Droit Civil. By
reading such a book, one can pick up at the same time enough of the
French language and the general outlines of French law. The task is
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neither boring or troublesome, for French jurists1 usually write with a
clarity and elegance which is certainly not the rule among English speak-
ing lawyers. Indeed, French law is admirably served in this respect by
those who teach it, and to acquire a general knowledge of French Civil
Law is actually a pleasurable undertaking.
THE SOURCES OF FRENCH LAW
A conceptual framework is only half the technique of a legal system.
The other half is concerned with the sources of the law and the ways in
which they are used. Some comparative lawyers have found here the
greatest difference between French law and the common law systems,
and have emphasized the difficulty that a common law lawyer will find
in handling French source material. I believe that this is an exaggera-
tion, and for that reason and because the French sources are admirably
described and discussed in a recent book by Professors Ren6 David and
Henry P. de Vries,2 I propose to say less about them than I should
otherwise have thought necessary. Moreover, whereas the general struc-
ture of substantive law can be learned well enough from books-this is
especially true of a "bookish" law largely built on a study of the Roman
law books-the handling of source material can be learned only by prac-
tice. However, no student can begin to understand French law unless
he has a general understanding of its sources. I must therefore say a
few words about them.
The main sources of common law systems are judicial decisions,
legislation, extrajudicial literature, and, except in the United Kingdom,
a written constitution. Of these the constitution, where it exists, is
paramount, legislation (provided it is constitutional) ranks next, judicial
decisions enjoy such authority as is attributed to them by the ruling
doctrine of precedent and, incidentally, may give to legislation an un-
expected interpretation. Extrajudicial writing, in treatises and law re-
view articles, enjoys an authority which is at best persuasive and varies
with the prestige of the author. Constitutions may be very fragmentary,
legislation is in the aggregate incomplete, though partial codes may cover
the whole of several branches of the law. Where there is no enacted
law, the gap is notionally filled by common law or equity, both bodies of
doctrine having being laid down by past judicial decisions or, if not so laid
1. The word "jurist" is throughout this lecture used in the sense it bears in Eng-
land, i.e., as denoting a lawyer who discusses the law in a learned way outside the courts
in treatises or articles. It is not synonymous with either "lawyer" in the wide sense
of the term or "judge."
2. DAVID AND DEVRIEs, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL
LAW SYSTEMaS (1958).
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down, at least expected to be laid down by other decisions in the future.
Thus, the original deposit of law is judge-made law, and all the rest
merely modifies it.
Now, in French law, with the one important exception of adminis-
trative law, the position is in theory quite different. Legislation, in the
form of codes or other statutes, is primary, in the sense that all courts,
when deciding cases, must base their decisions on some enactment. More-
over, since any judge who refuses to decide a case on the pretext that the
law is silent commits a criminal offense, all enactments taken in the
aggregate must provide a solution for every problem. Thus the latent
completeness of common law and equity, taken together, finds in France
its counterpart in the latent completeness of the enacted law. There is,
however, no pretense that administrative law is completely contained in
codes or other enactments.
Another important difference between French law and Common
Law systems outside the United Kingdom is that the courts cannot ques-
tion the constitutionality of acts of parliament. In spite of the fact that
the legislative powers of parliament are limited by a constitution, there is
no judicial review of statutes. Rules, regulations, or other acts of sub-
ordinate legislation are another matter. They are treated not as legisla-
tive but as administrative acts and their validity can be questioned in a
court of law, most commonly before the Conseil d'etat, the supreme
administrative court.
"JURISPRUDENCE" AND "DOCTRINE"
It is difficult enough to estimate the authority of judicial decisions
and extrajudicial writings in England, and much more difficult in the
United States. At one time it was fairly easy to make such an estimate
for France. Both had only persuasive authority, though a constant
course of decision or an unanimous opinion of the jurists more or less
fixed the law, and if courts and jurists were in full agreement there was,
for the time being at least, no doubt. At the present day, the balance of
authority has swung decisively in favor of the courts, at any rate of the
highest court, the Cour de Cassation, which has increased its authority by
adhering pretty constantly to its own precedents. But on a lower level
the regional courts of appeal, while they almost invariably follow the
lead of the Cour de Cassation, do not seem to adhere so closely to their
own previous decisions, and they accept only the jurisprudence constante
of the other courts of appeal taken as a whole. I accept the finding of
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M. and Mme. Tunc3 on this matter: French courts adhere to precedent
less strongly than English courts but more strongly than American.
However, three qualifications must be made. In the first place,
although there is an immense flow of litigation in France, only a trifling
fraction of all the cases are reported. Thus, the mass of precedent is not
nearly so great as in America and is probably a good deal less even than
in England. In the second place, some of the sparseness of reporting is
due to the much looser texture of French law. The French courts are
much more inclined than common law courts to decide cases on the facts
and show little tendency to turn fact into law, partly no doubt because
there are no civil juries. Thirdly, although French courts, unlike com-
mon law courts, are bound to give reasons for their decisions, they do not
set out their reasons as explicitly as common law courts. The Cour de
Cassation is almost sphinx-like in this respect. Hence the habit the re-
porters have formed of employing eminent jurists to write long footnotes
to cases, in which they try to explain the opinions of the courts, to criti-
cize them and to relate them to the rest of the law. So, although it is not
unfair to regard France as a case-law country, an American lawyer will
find its jurisprudence very unfamiliar.
If the importance of jurisprudence has increased, that of doctrine,
the writings of jurists, has certainly declined. But we have it on the ex-
cellent authority of Professors David and de Vries that its present status
is especially hard to assess." No study has been made of it recently. I
would hazard the opinion that it is not only much higher than in Eng-
land, but higher even than in America in spite of the enhancement of the
academic lawyer's status. For in France the jurist's authority antedates
the judge's; he still counts to some extent as the successor of the classical
jurists who were the main agents in developing Roman Law. French law
professors are well known by name, whereas that is true of only a minute
portion of the judges. Then French professors speak ex cathedra and
leave their views in no doubt; and although they always include rebels
and are in the mass forward looking enough, their main task has always
been to hand down, analyze, systematize and polish a body of received
doctrine. Even when a marked shift has taken place, their prevailing
tendency is to set to work to build up a new solid edifice; they have a
taste for constructing, if not wide ranging systems, at least fairly ex-
tensive coherent bodies of doctrine. Contrast with this Professor J. P.
3. ANDRt AND SUZANNE TUNE, LE DROIT DES ATTAS-UNIS D'AmRIQUE: SOuRCEs
ET TECHNIQUES 183 (1955).
4. DAVID AND DE VRMs, op. cit. sura note 2, at 126.
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Dawson's remark that in America "When anyone ventures to construct
a system, we all set cheerfully to work to destroy it."5
THE CIVIL CODE
I have said that the ultimate source of French law, except for the
general principles of administrative law, is always in theory some act of
legislation, and that the Civil Code occupies a central position in it. The
difference between a central Civil Code and a central common law must
always be kept in sight; but it must not be allowed to obscure realities.
For it would probably be correct to say that the Civil Code hampers
French lawyers in developing the law less than the common law hampers
American or English lawyers. This is so for a number of reasons.
The first is that it is old, having existed for over a hundred and
fifty years, and that, although France has changed much less in the last
century and a half than England or America-who knows how successful
the new regime will be in breaking the crust of conservatism ?-at many
points it cannot be applied precisely as it was in 1804. To some extent
it has been amended by subsequent legislation, but almost always in the
parts which are not preeminently lawyers' law. Lawyers' law has been
modified by the interpretation given to the Code, first by the courts and
then by the courts and jurists in conjunction.
But, secondly, the most influential among the compilers of the Code,
Portalis, in a much-quoted passage disclaimed any wish to bind posterity.
Hence, the Code was deliberately made loose-textured. No attempt was
made to enunciate a coherent doctrinal system. Important questions were
pin-pointed and given a solution, but a good deal of play was left in the
machine.
Thirdly, even so, the courts have from time to time played fast and
loose, if not with the actual words of the Code, at any rate with their
obvious underlying meaning. Exceptions have been made to swallow up
rules, the balance of importance between two doctrines has been shifted
so as to make the less important one prevail over the more important, and
so on. As might have been expected, the changes have taken place in
those parts of the law where they have not been likely to disappoint the
reasonable expectations of those who planned their activities on the basis
of the existing law.
I will give only two examples of such progressive interpretations.
The Civil Code enunciates the general principle that a person cannot ex-
act a promise for a third party otherwise than as an agent. By way of
exception it provides that a person can stipulate for the benefit of a third
5. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRIcHMENT 111 (1951).
APPROACH TO FRENCH LAW
party when this is the condition of a stipulation for his own benefit or
of a donation made for another. By a devious course of interpretation
the exception has been made to eat up the rule, so that third party rights
are now fully protected in French law.
An example of the way in which what was originally regarded as a
less important has been made to prevail over a more important provision
is the substitution of strict liability for liability based on fault. In what
is certainly the principal article, a person is made liable to repair damage
caused by his fault. Then, in another article which was almost certainly
intended to be subsidiary, he is made liable for damage caused by things
under his care without any explicit requirement that they must have been
of a dangerous character or that he must have been at fault in not con-
trolling them sufficiently. After sleeping unnoticed for about a century,
this subsidiary article was suddenly brought into the limelight and, in-
terpreted literally, has left little room for actions in which fault has to
be proved.
There is a general impression abroad that French courts interpret
legislation more freely than common law courts, and that they pay less
attention to the grammatical sense of words and more to the ratio legis
and to legislative history. This view is in general correct, but we have
recently been reminded that it hardly applies to criminal law and tax law,
where statutes are in general strictly construed. Moreover this is also
true of what are called lois d'exception7 that is to say, statutes which
derogate from the general principles of the Codes. Since courts in com-
mon law countries traditionally interpret enactments so as to derogate
as little as possible from the common law, this is a good example of a
resemblance to which I have already alluded, between the Codes, in
particular the Civil Code, and the unenacted law of the common law
systems.
Before I pass to procedure may I just mention the important fact
that French law makes no distinction between law and equity. Most of
the institutions and remedies of what we call equity are known to French
law except for the trust, but they are completely integrated with the rest
of the law; for equity has never been administered in separate courts. An
American or English student of French law need certainly not be dis-
tressed by the absence of a familiar distinction and may even fail to
notice it.
6. DAVID AND DE VRIES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 90.
7. Id. at 91.
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PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The details of legal procedure are so much the concern of practicing
lawyers that the layman, if he is wise, and indeed the foreign lawyer, is
peculiarly disinclined to meddle with them. A person who, perhaps
justly, feels satisfied that he can understand unaided his substantive
rights is readily persuaded that he needs professional help to enforce
them by legal proceedings. But this willingness to confess ignorance
extends only to detail. Most intelligent persons have a very good idea
of the general run of trial procedure and also deep-rooted notions, and
even prejudices, as to what it should be. Indeed, it would be fair to say
that the outlines of civil and criminal procedure are much better known
to the ordinary American or Englishman than any but a few points of
substantive law outside his special experience. He probably acts in his
ordinary affairs in what he considers to be a common sense sort of way,
without bothering about the law but upon a general subconscious assump-
tion that what is common sense is also good law. For him law usually
means the dramatic procedure of a jury trial; and in one way or an-
other he has in his mind a pretty accurate picture of counsel's speeches,
cross-examination, the aloof impartiality of the judge and the like. In
England at least, popular accounts of criminal trials have a very wide
circulation and all the world reads thrillers. I would go farther and
suggest that educated Frenchmen know more about the procedure in an
English court than a French trial, for one constantly finds them reading
English and American detective novels, whereas the French press gives
little space to the reporting of lawsuits.
The main principles of procedure are more deeply rooted in a na-
tion's habits and desires than most of substantive law, at any rate where
it does not concern the family or succession on death. Probably large
masses of the American substantive law, for instance of contracts or torts
or crime, could be replaced by French law without the change being no-
ticed by the ordinary citizen; and the converse would also be true. The
lawyer would feel at sea but not the layman. But if the juge d'instruction
were introduced into America or England or cross-examination into
French trials, the educated layman would scent unfairness or even oppres-
sion. That he would probably be wrong is beside the point. Each coun-
try is attached to the procedural safegrounds it has built up for itself and
has learned to avoid without special precautions most of the dangers that
the other country has been at pains to exclude.
Secondly, substantive law and procedure cannot be divorced. Least
of all can rights or liabilities be completely understood without consider-
ing the rules of evidence which govern the means by which they can be
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established in case of dispute. Now here there are profound differences
between French law and the common law systems. In the first place,
France has never known the civil jury, and the criminal jury, which is
used only in the most important cases, was introduced from England
only so late as the Revolution of 1789 and has been radically modified in
recent years. Hence, the relation between law and fact has always been
very different from that which exists in the common law systems. For
only one purpose does it need to be sharply drawn, namely, in order to
ascertain if the decision of a court of appeal can be attacked before the
Cour de Cassation, the one central civil and criminal court; for that court
cannot consider questions of fact. In other words in the actual trial of a
case, law and fact can be jumbled together without anyone being the
worse for it. There can be no question of turning fact into law in order
to withdraw cases from the jury in which prejudice might lead them to
find for one party or the other. Hence, French law is much looser-
textured and much less detailed than the common law systems. More-
over, the absence of the jury makes unnecessary the elaboration of ex-
clusionary rules of evidence such as those relating to hearsay. Profes-
sional judges can, it is thought, be trusted to discount or attribute di-
minished weight to evidence which in America is thought to be too
dangerous to submit to a jury. Whether in this the French are always
right is not quite certain. A very experienced French friend of mine
once told me that he would not trust even a judge not to be improperly
influenced by knowledge that an accused person had been previously con-
victed of similar offenses. But the French, who had once suffered under
an extremely technical and complicated system of proofs, reacted so vio-
lently as to leave the decision of cases to the intime conviction of the
judges. That is to say, the judges were to find the truth to their own
satisfaction untrammeled by technical rules.
This means that proof of fact is not nearly so strict as in common
law systems. If the judge is convinced of the truth of an allegation, that
is enough. If a party is not then satisfied, he can appeal, but that only
means that he has a chance of convincing another, probably more expert
or experienced judge. Hence, although French law retains-to a greater
degree than American or English law-rules excluding the testimony of
certain kinds of witnesses, the judge can often make use of their unsworn
statements.
By way of compensation, oral testimony is excluded from civil pro-
cedure to a much greater degree than in England or even America. It is
as if the Statute of Frauds extended to all acts in the law. Even in acci-
dent cases the evidence of witnesses is viewed with suspicion. Credence
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is attached rather to measurements taken by the police. It is Perhaps
partly for this reason that the French courts have substituted strict lia-
bility in such cases for the old liability resting on proof of fault.
Written documents and other writings receive a treatment very dif-
ferent from that accorded them in America or England. In the first
place, they prove themselves in a way that would shock most common
lawyers; and to attack their genuineness is a serious and troublesome
matter. For this and other reasons, to prove a contract by written evi-
dence is surprisingly easy. But once proved the picture changes: the
written terms of a contract are by no means as conclusive as they would
be here or in England; oral evidence can be given to explain or even vary
them. With respect to commercial cases written evidence is in general
unnecessary since they are normally tried in special courts. Thus, to
enunciate the French law of contracts without reference to the ways in
which they are proved may be very misleading.
How far apart French legal practice is from that of England may
be judged from a dialogue which took place in my presence. A very
distinguished French judge was explaining the decisive importance at-
tached to serious and concordant presumptions. The English professor
asked him how the raw facts were established on which the presumptions
were founded, upon which the Frenchman answered that they were rarely
in dispute. At that the dialogue had most disappointingly to be brought
to a close.
I do not know what is the moral of all this discussion of procedure
and evidence, unless it be to warn my hearers that even if they have ac-
customed themselves to the fairly strange world of French substantive
law they have fresh surprises in store when they came to actual practice.
But such surprises can be beneficial, for they can help them to see more
clearly into the nature of France and the French people.
CONCLUSION
Now to end. I am too old a hand to assume the hazardous task of
characterizing French law as a whole or of comparing it in a few words
with the common law systems. When I feel tempted to praise its logical
perspicuity and the way in which it hangs together as a coherent system,
I am reminded that it has nothing so abstract or so logical as the English
law of real property, and that the French law of torts is if anything more
fluid and empirical than the English. If I feel when reading the great
treatises on French law that the jurists know much better than we what
they are doing and how to explain it, when I turn to the reports of cases
in the Cour de Cassation I feel that the judges know better than anyone
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else how to conceal such knowledge. In spite of the Cartesian clarity of
thought of which Frenchmen are so proud, French law is no less full of
inconsistencies than the common law system. In other words, it contains
the idiomatic irregularities of an old and civilized language; and just as
the French language, so clear and translucent in its elegant simplicity,
eludes the efforts of all who have not been brought up from childhood to
use it, so French law with all its rationality and massive good sense eludes,
while it fascinates, the foreign observer.
